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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 16, 2012, the Fourth Circuit of the United States Court
of Appeals, in its Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Brand' opinion, weighed in
on a highly debated topic in arbitration in the United States, namely that
of "manifest disregard of the law." Since the United States Supreme
Court's Hall Street2 decision in 2008, the circuit courts have been split as
to whether the common-law doctrine of manifest disregard of the law is
still a valid ground for vacating arbitration awards in cases under the
United States Arbitration Act, more commonly known as the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA").' Even though manifest disregard is not among
the enumerated grounds for vacatur under the FAA,' and the Supreme
Court in Hall Street held that "the statutory grounds [of vacatur in the
FAA] are exclusive,"s the circuit courts have varying interpretations. The
U.S. circuit courts have split into three camps over the meaning of the
word "exclusive" in Hall Street.' The first camp reasons that manifest
disregard is no longer a valid ground for vacatur because the FAA's
I Wachovia Secs., L.L.C. v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012).
2 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
3 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. %5 1-307 (2012).
4 These are: "(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." Id. § 10(a)(1)-(4).
s Hall St., 552 U.S. at 578.
6 Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 481 n.7.
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grounds are exclusive.' The second camp's narrow reading of Hall Street
results in the survival of manifest disregard as a separate ground for
vacatur.' The third camp holds that manifest disregard applies unchanged
post-Hall Street but follows a different reasoning than the second camp.'
The third camp holds that manifest disregard continues to exist as a
shorthand or a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur in the
FAA, more specifically the FAA § 10(a)(4)."o By using this sweeping
language, these courts justify an unchanged application of manifest
disregard post-Hall Street." This inclusion of the manifest disregard
doctrine in the FAA 10(a)(4) is confusing because the concepts are
distinguishable. The manifest disregard doctrine challenges the arbitrator's
application of the law to the dispute at hand, while a challenge of the
arbitrator's power under the FAA § 10(a)(4) queries whether the
arbitrator's contractual authority extended to resolving the dispute at
hand.
In Wachovia, the Fourth Circuit held that it does not belong to the
first camp but did not find it necessary to decide whether it belonged to
the second or the third camp because the result would be the same in both
these camps.' 2 This is not surprising because the courts belonging to the
third camp have not articulated any difference between manifest disregard
as an independent ground for vacatur as compared to a shorthand or a
judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds in the FAA.
This article critiques the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Wachovia. The
Fourth Circuit should have acknowledged that its own line of cases was
inconsistent with Hall Street; therefore, they should have been overruled.
Instead, the Fourth Circuit upheld its own line of cases by holding that
"manifest disregard continues to exist either as an independent ground for
review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. (Stolt-Nielsen 1), 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008),
rev'd on other grounds, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. (Stolt-Nielsen II), 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (ifan
"arbitrator knew of the relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the
disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it" the Second Circuit will
vacate the arbitration award); see also Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cit.
2009) ("We have stated that for an arbitrator's award to be in manifest disregard of the law, '[i]t must be clear
from the record that the arbitrator [ ] recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.' ").
to See Stolt-Nielsen 1, 548 F.3d at 93-94; see also Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290.
" See Stolt-Nielsen 1, 548 F.3d at 95; see also Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290.
12 Wchovia, 671 F.3d at 483.
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forth at [the FAA] § 10."" This cannot be so. The first proposition is
explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Hall Street. The second
proposition fails because manifest disregard cannot be a gloss on excess of
power because the concepts are distinguishable. In addition, the Fourth
Circuit found dubious support for its holding in the U.S. Supreme
Court's Stolt-Nielsenl4 opinion. This is surprising because the Supreme
Court explicitly stated in Stolt-Nielsen that it "[did] not decide whether
'manifest disregard' survives [its] decision in [Hall Street]."1
This article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces arbitration under
the FAA as well as some fundamental concepts in arbitration that are
essential in order to follow the critique presented against the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Wachovia. Part III explains the reasoning behind the
doctrine of manifest disregard of the law. Part IV summarizes three
essential U.S. Supreme Court decisions discussed by the Fourth Circuit in
its Wachovia opinion: Wilko, Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen. Part V
describes the U.S. Circuit Courts' split regarding manifest disregard
following the ruling in Hall Street. Part VI reviews the Fourth Circuit's
Wachovia case, followed in Part VII by a critique of the same.
II. AN INTRODUCTION To ARBITRATION UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
A. Arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA with the purpose of trying to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements
that the American courts had adopted from the English common law.16
Based on Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause, the FAA is a
body of federal substantive law to be applied by both state and federal
courts." The FAA provides for arbitration in maritime transactions and
contracts for transactions involving interstate or foreign commerce.18
B. The Contractual Character of Arbitration
A party cannot be required to submit a dispute to arbitration unless it
13 Id. at 483 n.7.
14 Stot-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. at 1758.
15 Id. at 1768 n.3.
16 1 MARTIN DOMKF, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 7-4 (3d ed. 2012).
17 Id. 7-6.
I8 Id. 7-4.
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has agreed to do so." State law generally governs the interpretation of an
arbitration agreement, but the FAA imposes certain fundamental rules,
including the need for consent, as opposed to coercion.20 Arbitration
agreements must be interpreted under the accepted rules of contract
law.2 ' When enforcing an arbitration agreement or construing an
arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must give effect to the contractual
rights and expectations of the parties, "the parties' intentions control" the
interpretation.22
C. Vacating an Arbitral Award when an Arbitrator Exceeds His or Her
Power
The scope of the arbitrator's power is of interest from the point of
view ofjudicial review. If an arbitrator "exceeded [his or her powers,] or
so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made," then the arbitration award
may be vacated under the FAA 10(a)(4). 23  The parameters of an
arbitrator's powers are defined by the issues submitted to the arbitrator and
by the arbitrator's authority as set forth in the arbitration agreement. 2 4
The arbitrator is empowered to decide all issues of fact and law, unless he
or she is contractually restricted from doing so in some specific way by the
language of the arbitration clause. 25 Arbitration agreements typically
prohibit an arbitrator from expanding, narrowing or deviating from the
terms of the agreement in connection with which the dispute has arisen.2 6
Arbitrators exceed their powers if they decide issues not presented to
them, or when they grant relief not authorized in the arbitration
agreement.27
i9 Id. § 1-2; an exception to that rule, however, is that a nonparty may force arbitration if the relevant
state contract law allows the nonparty to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. Id. 5 7-4.
2o Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. at 1773.
21 1 DOMKE, supra note 16, § 1-2.
22 Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. at 1773-74.
23 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012).
24 2 DOMKE, supra note 16, § 39-6.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. ("An arbitrator also exceeds his or her authority when he or she: (1) not only settles the dispute
between the primary parties, but also determines the secondary liability of the losing party's successor
corporation: (2) wrongly awards relief to non-grievance employees; (3) awards an unrequested item of damages
substantially larger than any item claimed in the submission; (4) determines questions of law when the agreement
limits determinations to questions of fact: (5) relies on the definition of a term which conflicted with a term
defined in the agreement; (6) awards a remedy not contemplated by the arbitration agreement; (7) fashions a
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D. The FAA's Procedural Grounds for Vacatur and Modifications of
Arbitral Awards
The FAA provides for the challenge of arbitration awards on matters
of procedural fairness. 28  The grounds for vacatur under the FAA§ 10(a)(1)-(4) are:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.2 9
An award may also be modified or corrected, but not vacated, under
the FAA § 11:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures
or an evident material mistake in the description of any person,
thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of
the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting
the merits of the controversy.30
remedy not contained in a collective bargaining agreement by adding to, amending and/or departing from the
terms of the agreement; (8) hears an untimely grievance; or (9) awards punitive damages to investors under one
state law where the customer agreement clearly established another state law as the governing law.").
28 Cf W. LAURENCE CRIlc, WILIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INlTERNATIONAL CH AMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION 503 (3d ed. 2000) ("In the United States, [prior to Hall Street], some but not all
federal courts ... permitted the parties by contract to expand the scope ofjudicial review of awards beyond the
procedural fairness grounds provided by the [FAA]") (italics added).
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (2012).
30 Id. § 11.
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III. MANIFEST DiSREGARD OF THE LAw: A COMMON LAW
GROUND FOR VACATUR OF ARBITRATION AwARDs
A. Background and Definition
The origins of modern manifest disregard as an independent
common-law basis for reviewing American arbitration decisions likely lie
in dicta from the Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Wilko, discussed
below."1 The federal courts base their definitions of manifest disregard on
these dicta.32 Manifest disregard is where an arbitrator knew of a relevant
legal principle, understood that this principle controlled the outcome of
the disputed issue, but nonetheless willfully ignored the governing law by
refusing to apply it.13 Unlike any of the enumerated procedural grounds
for vacatur in the FAA, the connon law manifest disregard doctrine
allows a court to scrutinize how the arbitrator judged the legal merits of
the dispute.3 4
Manifest disregard of the law is, however, more than legal error or
misunderstanding; that is, a court would not set aside an arbitral award
because it rejected an arbitrator's conclusion as to the meaning or
applicability of laws.3  Manifest disregard is where an arbitrator recognizes
binding appellate case law, then proceeds to deliberately disregard it."
The proof of this requires some showing in the record, other than the
result obtained, that the arbitrator knew the law applied, yet expressly
disregarded it.3' An arbitrator's awareness of the law is imputed only if the
governing law has been identified by the parties to the arbitration;
otherwise, knowledge and intent are inferred only if the error is so
obvious that it would instantly be perceived as such by the average person
31 Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 480 (discussing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds
by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
32 Ann C. Gronlund, Note, The Future of Manifest Disregard As a Valid Ground for Vacating Arbitration
Awards in Light of the Supreme Court's Ruling in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 96 IowA L. RiV.
1351, 1359 (2011).
3 4 TrioMAs H. OEI-MKF, OE'ilMKE COMMERCiAL ARBITR.ATIoN § 149-2 (3rd ed. 2010).
34 Compare international arbitration, where "[tlhree statutory models have emerged for review of
international arbitral awards at the seat of arbitration. The first provides for appeal on the legal merits of the
dispute, coupled with a right to challenge awards for procedural defects in the arbitration such as arbitrator bias,
excess of authority or denial of due process. Under the second paradigm, the loser has a right to challenge an
award only for procedural defects, not error of law. A third model foresees nojudicial review at all." CRAiGi, supra
note 28, at 502-03.
3s 4 OEl-MKE, supra note 33, 5 149-2.
36 Id. (citation omitted).
37 Id.
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qualified to serve as an arbitrator.38 As a defense, the manifest disregard
challenge can be overcome by substantial evidence in the record
supporting the award's conclusion.3 1
B. Arguments for Manifest Disregard
The justification behind manifest disregard is that a party should not
have to live with an egregious result on the merits in an arbitration that is
a consequence from the deliberate failure to apply the law.4 0 Under this
theory, the doctrine is important because it serves as a protection against
manifest wrongs by arbitrators. The need for protection is particularly
evident in adhesion contracts, which translate into uneven playing fields
that may be corrected by judicial review.4 1 Moreover, mandatory
arbitration clauses are becoming an increasingly important part of
commercial contracts in a variety of industries, such as securities,
employment, health care, and insurance.4 2 In this context, arbitration is
not the result of a negotiated contract and can instead pose as a
disadvantage to a less sophisticated party.4 3 Parties forced into arbitration
lose their right to a trial, a negative impact that would be exacerbated by a
further limitation on judicial review." The manifest disregard doctrine
protects individuals in mandatory arbitration from what could possibly be
an unfair forum unconcerned with legal principles.4
C. Arguments against Manifest Disregard
Manifest disregard conflicts with the essence of arbitration. Arbitration
is not meant to be litigation, and when parties agree to arbitrate, they
inevitably gain the benefits of arbitration but also sacrifice some of the
features of litigation, including a full appellate process.46 The arbitrator's
award is meant to be final, thereby increasing the speed and efficiency of
the procedure. The manifest disregard doctrine erodes two of the defining
38 Id.
39 Id. S 149-9.
40 Annie Chen, Note, The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the Law After Hal Street: Implication for Judicial
Review of International Arbitrations in U.S. Courts, 32 FoRollAM INT L L.J. 1872, 1884 (2009).
41 Id.
42 Id.
4 Id. at 1884-85.
44 Id. at 1885.
5 Id.
46 Id. at 1886.
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features of arbitration as compared to litigation: finality and efficiency.4 7 A
potential problem caused by the existence of this doctrine is the "poor
loser syndrome," parties dissatisfied with arbitration may appeal weak or
even meritless claims on the assumption that they have nothing to lose.48
As a consequence, manifest disregard also weakens the cost-effectiveness
that is meant to be an advantage of arbitration."9 In addition, manifest
disregard may indirectly discourage arbitrators from issuing reasoned
awards and instead encourage arbitral decision making with less
transparency." This happens because, in the absence of reasoned awards
that reveal how the arbitrator reached her decision, courts are unable to
evaluate whether the arbitrator has manifestly disregarded the law."'
IV. THE SuPREVIE COURT's WILKO, HALL STREET AND
STOLT-NELSEN DECISIONS
A. Wilko: Dicta Indicating Vacatur of Arbitration Awards for Manifest
Disregard
The federal courts base their definitions of manifest disregard on dicta
in the Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Wilko.52 In Wilko, a customer
brought suit under the Securities Act of 1933 for alleged
misrepresentation by partners in a securities brokerage firm.1 Although
the question presented to the Supreme Court on certiorari was whether
the dispute should be referred to arbitration, the Supreme Court, in dicta,
considered whether "a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance
with the provisions of the Securities Act" might be subject to judicial
review.5 4 The conclusion reached was that an arbitrator's decision would
have to be in "manifest disregard" of the law to be vacated." The
Supreme Court specified that "a failure of the arbitrators to decide in
accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act would constitute
grounds for vacating the award pursuant to [the FAA § 10]," but "that
4 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1887.
50 Id.
s1 Id.
52 See United States v. Doe, 968 F.2d 86, 88 (D.C. 1992) (outlining the importance of the Ward test).
s3 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29, overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp.,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
54 See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
55 See id, at 436-37
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failure would need to be made clearly.""
B. Hall Street: The Statutory Grounds of Vacatur in the FAA are
Exclusive
In Hall Street, the question before the Supreme Court of the United
States was whether the statutory grounds in the FAA %5 9-11 for prompt
vacatur and modification may be supplemented by contract." The
Supreme Court held that the statutory grounds could not be
supplemented by contract because "the statutory grounds are exclusive.""
The dispute in this case was between a commercial landlord and a tenant
about the tenant's alleged failure to comply with applicable environmental
law.5 9 The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration, and included in the
arbitration agreement that
[t]he United States District Court for the District of Oregon may
enter judgment upon any award, either by confirrming the award
or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court
shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii)
where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous.o
The arbitrator decided for the tenant.' Subsequently, the landlord
filed a motion with the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon asking the court to vacate, modify, and/or correct the arbitrator's
award on the ground that the arbitrator had committed a legal error.62
The district court agreed, vacated the award, and remanded the case for
further consideration by the arbitrator." The district court expressly
applied the standard of review chosen by the parties in the arbitration
agreement, which included review for legal error.64 On remand, the
arbitrator amended the award to favor the landlord." This time, both
parties sought modification, and again the district court applied the
56 Id. at 436.
57 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
58 Id.
5 Id. at 579.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 580.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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parties' stipulated standard of review for legal error, correcting the
arbitrator's calculation of interest but otherwise upholding the award in
favor of the landlord.66 Both parties then appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit."7 The Ninth Circuit reversed in favor of the tenant
and instructed the district court on remand to confirm the original
arbitration award, unless the award should be vacated on any of the
grounds allowed under the FAA % 10, or modified or corrected under any
of the grounds allowed under the FAA § 11." After the district court
again held for the landlord - this time on the ground that the arbitrator
exceeded his powers - and the Ninth Circuit once more reversed, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.69
Although the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the
grounds for vacatur and modification provided by the FAA §§ 10 and 11
were exclusive, the Court vacated the award and remanded the case for
consideration of independent issues." The Court held that
[i]nstead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three
provisions, [the FAA] % 9-11, as substantiating a national policy
favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to
maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway. Any other reading opens the door to the full-borne
legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal arbitration
merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming
judicial review process, and bring arbitration theory to grief in
post-arbitration process.7 '
Nonetheless, the Court did not rule out that additional grounds for
vacatur may exist.
In holding that [the FAA] %5 10 and 11 provide exclusive
regimes for the review provided by the statute, [the Court does]
not purport to say that they exclude more searching review based
on authority outside the statute as well. The FAA is not the only
way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards:
they may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or
66 Id.
67 Hall St., 552 U.S. at 580 (2008).
68 Id. at 581.
69 Id. at 581 n.1.
70 Id. at 581.
71 Id. at 588 (citation omitted).
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common law, for example, where judicial review of different
scope is arguable.7 2
Thus, if the FAA applies to a case, the U.S. Supreme Court discredits
manifest disregard of the law as an independent basis for vacatur outside
the grounds provided in the FAA 10." On the other hand, if the
arbitration is governed by state statutory or common law, those rules may
pemit judicial review of a different and more extensive scope as
compared to the FAA. 74 In other words, the FAA's statutory grounds for
vacatur are not exclusive when a court interprets the provisions of a state's
arbitration code or common law."
Domke on Commercial Arbitration discusses a case from the Texas
Supreme Court to illustrate such possible alternative laws." In Nafta
Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, the Texas Supreme Court was faced with the
following questions in an employment case alleging sex discrimination: (1)
whether or not the Texas General Arbitration Act ("TAA"), like the FAA,
precludes agreement for judicial review of an arbitration award for
reversible error; and, if not, (2) whether the FAA preempts enforcement
of such agreement." The Texas Supreme Court held that the TAA did
not preclude the parties from agreeing to expand the scope of judicial
review." It ruled further that the FAA did not preempt enforcement of an
arbitration agreement that expanded judicial review.
72 Hall St., 552 U.S. at 581 (2008) (citation omitted).
7 See 4 OI.HMKlI, supra note 33, S 149-2.
7 Cf. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 590 ("But here we speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review
under %§ 9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for judicial enforcement of arbitration
awards. Although one such avenue is now claimed to be revealed in the procedural history of this case, no claim to
it was presented when the case arrived on our doorstep, and no reason then appeared to us for treating this as
anything but an FAA case.") (italics added).
7 See 4 OEHMKE, supra note 33, § 149-2 ("While the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to discredit
manifest disregard. . . outside the grounds provided in FAA S 10, it is still helpful to understand the doctrine. . . as
there still may be applications for review under a specific state law, where an arbitral award is reviewed under the
terms of a judicial order referring a matter in litigation to arbitration, or with common law review.").
76 2 DOMKE, supra note 16, § 38-3 (discussing Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 455 (U.S. 2011)).
n Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Tex. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 455 (U.S. 2011).
78 Id. at 96.
7 Id. at 101; The Texas Supreme Court held that it "must, ofcourse, follow Hall Street in applying the
FAA, but in construing the TAA, [it is] obliged to examine Hall Street's reasoning and reach [its] own
judgment." Id. at 91-92.
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C. Stolt-Nielsen: Where an Arbitration Clause Is Silent on the Issue, It
Does Not Include Class Action Arbitration
Arbitration is a matter of contract and the FAA's strong pro-
arbitration policy only applies to disputes which the parties have agreed to
arbitrate."' Arbitration agreements are only unenforceable under the FAA
if the agreement would be revocable under state contract law." In Stolt-
Nielsen, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the
arbitrators exceeded their powers when they construed the bilateral
arbitration clause at issue to include class-action arbitration.82 The
arbitration agreement was silent regarding class-action arbitration, and the
parties concurred that they had reached "no agreement" on that issue.8
The Supreme Court held that it was "clear from [its] precedents and the
contractual nature of arbitration that parties may specify with whom they
choose to arbitrate their disputes."" In Stolt-Nielsen, the arbitrators
incorrectly interpreted the parties' silence on the issue of class-action
arbitration as consent." This interpretation was prohibited because "the
differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great. "86
Consequently, the Court held that the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
and vacated the arbitral award pursuant to the FAA § 10(a)(4)."
V. Tim U.S. CIRCUIT COURTS' SPLIT REGARDING
MANIFEST DISREGARD
A. The Three Camps
The U.S. circuit courts have split into three camps about the meaning
of the word "exclusive" in Hall Street." The first camp (the First (dicta),
Fifth, Seventh," Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits) has read Hall Street as
go 1 DOMKE, supra note 16, § 7-4.
81 1 Id. § 7-4.
82 Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
83 Id. at 1775.
84 Id. at 1774.
85 Id. at 1775.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1770.
8 Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 481 n.7.
89 Although the Seventh Circuit asserts that manifest disregard "is not a ground on which a court may
reject an arbitrator's award under the [FAA]," it still struggles to completely let go of the term. Affymax, Inc. v.
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011). The Seventh Circuit has
recognized that manifest disregard applies when an award "directs the parties to violate the legal rights of third
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holding that the common law standards are no longer valid grounds for
vacatur because the FAA's grounds are exclusive." The second camp,
which consists only of the Sixth Circuit, holds that manifest disregard
survives as an independent ground for vacatur." The Sixth Circuit read
Hall Street narrowly and found that it only prohibited private parties from
contracting for greater judicial review.92 This suggests that the Sixth
Circuit read any further implications of Hall Street merely as dicta. The
third camp (the Second and Ninth Circuits) has held that since Hall
Street, manifest disregard exists as a shorthand or a judicial gloss for the
FAA 10(a)(4).' By using this sweeping language, these two courts
justify an unchanged application of manifest disregard post-Hall Street.94
The Third, and Tenth Circuits have not yet decided whether manifest
disregard survived Hall Street." In its Wachovia opinion, the Fourth
Circuit held that it does not belong to the first camp. However, the
Fourth Circuit did not find it necessary to decide whether it belonged to
the second or the third camp because the result would be the same.'
B. The Circuit Courts' Reasoning behind Abandonment, Survival, or
Shorthand and Judicial Gloss of Manifest Disregard
1. Abandonment
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning in rejecting manifest disregard as an
independent, non-statutory ground for setting aside an arbitration award,
persons who did not consent to the arbitration." Id. at 284. In the situation described, the arbitrator exceeds his
or her power regarding a non-consenting party. The FAA's enumerated grounds for vacatur already covers the
situation where an arbitrator exceeds his or her power. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning is superfluous.
9 Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v.
Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009); Med. Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc., 614 F.3d 485,
489 (8th Cir. 2010); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2010).
91 Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. Appx. 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008).
92 Id. at 418-19.
93 Stolt-Nielsen 1, 548 F.3d at 93-94, rev'd on other grounds, Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010));
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).
9 See Stolt-Nielsen 1, 548 F.3d at 95; see Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290.
9 Rite Aid N.J., Inc. v. United Food Commercial Workers Union, Local 1360, 449 F. App'x 126, 129
n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (the Third Circuit has not yet "addressed the question of whether manifest disregard of the law
remains a valid ground for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA, in light of [Hall Street]."); Abbott v.
Law Office ofPatrickJ. Mulligan, 440 F. App'x 612, 619-20 (10th Cir. 2011) (the Tenth Circuit has declined to
decide whether the manifest disregard standard should be entirely abandoned "in the absence of firm guidance
from the Supreme Court.").
96 Wahovia, 671 F.3d at 483.
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is that it found the Supreme Court's language "clear": under the FAA,
the statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds for vacatur." Further,
the court held that "the term itself, as a term of legal art, is no longer
useful in actions to vacate arbitration awards."" Hall Street made it plain
that the statutory language means what it says:ioo "courts must [confirm
the award] unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as
prescribed in [the FAA],""o' and there is nothing malleable about
"must."02 In the same way, the Eleventh Circuit agrees with the Fifth
Circuit that the categorical language of Hall Street compels the rejection
of manifest disregard.0a The Eighth Circuit has held that manifest
disregard is no longer viable, and "that an arbitral award may be vacated
only for the reasons enumerated in the FAA."' 0 4 Likewise, the First
Circuit, in dicta, "acknowledge[d] the Supreme Court's recent holding
in [Hall Street], that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for
vacating or modifying an arbitral award in cases brought under the
[FAA].""o Nonetheless, because the case decided by the First Circuit was
not an FAA case, the question whether Hall Street precluded manifest
disregard was not decided."o6 Although the Seventh Circuit agrees that
manifest disregard "is not a ground on which a court may reject an
arbitrator's award under the [FAA],"' 07 it still struggles to completely let
go of the term.
97 Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).
9 Id.
99 Id.
10 Id.
1o1 9 U.S.C. S 9 (2006) (emphasis added)
102 Citigroup, 562 F.3d at 358 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008)).
103 Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010).
104 Med. Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. Turner lnvs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010).
05 Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Bangor Gas
Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Servs. (U.S.) Inc., 695 F.3d 181, 187 (1st Cir. 2012) ("[Hall Street] has caused a circuit
split, with this court saying (albeit in dicta) that 'manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or
modifying an arbitral award in cases brought under the [FAA]"').
106 Ramos-Santiago, 524 F.3d at 124 n.3.
107 Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 660 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011).
10o The Seventh Circuit recognizes an exception, that manifest disregard applies when an award directs
the parties to violate the legal rights of third persons who did not consent to the arbitration. Id. at 284
("[D]espite the limited scope of § 10(a), a court may set aside an award that directs the parties to violate the legal
rights of third persons who did not consent to the arbitration. Thus an award directing the parties to form a cartel,
and fix prices or output, could be vacated as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, even though the [FAA]
does not authorize the award's vacatur. Arbitration implements contracts, and what the parties cannot do through
an express contract they cannot do through an arbitrator."). The Seventh Circuit's exception is where the
arbitrator acts in excess of his or her power regarding a non-consenting party. An arbitrator acting beyond his or
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2. Survival
In the unpublished Coffee Beanery opinion, the Sixth Circuit held
that manifest disregard survives as an independent ground for vacatur.' 09
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's language in Hall Street was
not strong enough to overrule the Sixth Circuit's precedent: "[i]n light of
the Supreme Court's hesitation to reject the 'manifest disregard' doctrine
in all circumstances, we believe it would be imprudent to cease employing
such a universally recognized principle.""o Even though the court
recognized that Hall Street significantly reduced the ability of federal
courts to vacate arbitration awards for reasons other than those specified in
the FAA § 10, it did not foreclose federal courts' review for an arbitrator's
manifest disregard of the law."' The Sixth Circuit read the decision
narrowly, and concluded that the Supreme Court held that the FAA does
not allow private parties to supplement by contract the FAA's statutory
grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award." 2 In other words, manifest
disregard still exists as an independent ground for vacatur to be applied by
the federal courts. This suggests that the Sixth Circuit read any further
implications of Hall Street merely as dicta.
3. Shorthand and Judicial Gloss
The Second Circuit has held that Hall Street "is undeniably
inconsistent with . . . treating the 'manifest disregard' standard as a ground
for vacatur entirely separate from those enumerated in the FAA."" 3
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit will continue to apply manifest disregard
in the exact same manner as it did prior to Hall Street."' The Second
Circuit reconciles this apparent contradiction by holding that manifest
disregard exists as a shorthand or a judicial gloss where the arbitrators
exceeded their authority under the FAA § 10(a)(4)."' According to the
Second Circuit, where the arbitrator manifestly disregards the law, he or
her scope of power falls under the FAA's enumerated grounds of vacacur. Hence, the Seventh Circuit's argument
is superfluous.
10 Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008).
110 Id.
I'I Id. at 418.
112 Id. at 418-19.
" Stolt-Nielsen 1, 548 F.3d at 94, rev'd on other grounds, Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
4 If an "arbitrator knew of the relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the
outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it" the
Second Circuit will vacate the arbitration award. Id. at 95.
us5 Id. at 94.
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she exceeds his or her authority because the arbitrator failed to interpret
the contract at all, because parties do not agree in advance to submit to an
arbitration that is carried out in manifest disregard of the law."'
The Ninth Circuit's reasons that manifest disregard exists as a
shorthand where the arbitrators exceeded their authority under the FAA
% 10(a)(4) mirrors the Second Circuit."' The Ninth Circuit found itself
bound by the "shorthand theory" in its pre-Hall Street precedent Kyocera
because its holding was not "clearly irreconcilable" with Hall Street."' As
a result, the Ninth Circuit will continue to apply manifest disregard in the
exact same manner as it did prior to Hall Street."' In Wachovia, the
Fourth Circuit held that it did not find it necessary to decide whether it
belonged to the second or the third camp, only that it did not belong to
the first camp. 2 () This is not surprising because the courts belonging to
the third camp have not articulated any difference between manifest
disregard as an independent ground for vacatur as compared to a
shorthand or a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds in the FAA.' 2 1
VI. WACHOVIA SECURITIES, LLC V. BRAND
On February 16, 2012, the Fourth Circuit in Wachovia upheld the
district court's refusal to vacate an arbitration award entered against
Wachovia, after Wachovia had brought several former employees to
arbitration on what the arbitrators determined were frivolous claims.1 2 2
Wachovia's challenge of the arbitration award on appeal rested on the
arguments of misconduct by the arbitrators in violation of the FAA
§ 10(a)(3)1 23 and that the award "manifestly disregarded" the law.124
Although the Fourth Circuit denied the challenge of the award, it also
held that "manifest disregard continues to exist either as an independent
ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for
116 Id. at 95.
117 Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Associates, 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).
118 Id. (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc)).
119 Id. ("We have stated that for an arbitrator's award to be in manifest disregard of the law, '[i]t must be
clear from the record that the arbitrator [ ] recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.'").
120 Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 483.
121 See Stolt-Nielsen 1, 548 F.3d at 95; see Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290.
122 Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 474.
123 See U.S.C. § 10 (3) (2006) ("where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced").
124 Wachvia, 671 F.3d at 474.
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vacatur set forth at the FAA § 10."125
In this case, Wachovia had terminated four employees, whereupon the
former employees all went to work for a competing brokerage firm.'2 6 In
the arbitration proceeding, Wachovia alleged that their former employees
violated their contractual and common law obligations when they joined
the competitor, for example, by soliciting current Wachovia clients.' 2 7
The former employees requested that the arbitrators award them
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending themselves "from
Wachovia's baseless and unwarranted claims."' 2 8 They also asserted
counterclaims under the South Carolina Wage Payment Act ("SCWPA"),
and the common law doctrines of unjust enrichment and conversion.12 9
The former employees did not assert any claims under the South Carolina
Frivolous Civil Proceedings Act ("FCPA").30
The arbitrators denied all of Wachovia's claims, and awarded the
former employees damages under the SCWPA, as well as attorneys' fees
under the FCPA."' Wachovia argued for vacatur on two grounds in the
district court.'3 2 First, it contended that the arbitration panel exceeded its
authority and manifestly disregarded the law under the FAA § 10(a)(4) by
failing to follow the procedural requirements under the FCPA."' Second,
it argued that the arbitrators deprived Wachovia of a fundamentally fair
hearing under the FAA § 10(a)(3).
The district court began by rejecting Wachovia's argument that the
arbitrators exceeded their authority under the FAA § 10(a)(4), because the
arbitrators had decided an issue properly before them, the question of
fees.13 - The district court further rejected Wachovia's claim that the
arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law, because Wachovia failed to
show that the arbitrators understood the law as having a meaning which
they chose to ignore.' 3 ' Finally, the district court denied Wachovia's claim
that it had been deprived of a fundamentally fair hearing under the FAA
125 Id. at 483.
126 Id. at 475.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 477.
132 Id.
13 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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10(a)(3), because any deficiencies in the hearing were of Wachovia's
own creation.
On appeal, Wachovia once again argued that the arbitrators had
violated the FAA § 10(a)(3) and that they had manifestly disregarded the
law.'" 8 However, this time Wachovia did not make any claims directly
under the FAA 10(a)(4), but instead argued that manifest disregard is a
"judicial gloss" on the FAA § 10(a)(3) and (4).139 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court. 1 4() It agreed with the district
court that "Wachovia [was] the architect of its own misfortune"
regarding the alleged deprivation of a fundamentally fair hearing.' 4 1 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit found that although manifest disregard
survived Hall Street, Wachovia had not demonstrated that the arbitrators
manifestly disregarded the law.142
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis with a brief history of the
manifest disregard doctrine as well as its own manifest disregard standard
prior to Hall Street, which was "that for a court to vacate an award under
the manifest disregard theory, the arbitration record must show that (1)
the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to
reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrator refused to heed that legal
principle."' 4 3  The Fourth Circuit recognized the Supreme Court's
holding in Hall Street, that the FAA prohibited parties from contractually
expanding judicial review based on the theory that the grounds for vacatur
in the FAA are "exclusive."1 4 4
Without any further analysis of Hall Street or its implications, the
Fourth Circuit turned its attention to "the Supreme Court's more recent
decision in Stolt-Nielsen[, which] sheds further light on the operation of
'manifest disregard' post-Hall Street."'4 s The question in Stolt-Nielsen
was whether class action arbitration was permitted where the arbitration
clause was silent on that point.14 6 Based on the following footnote in
Stolt-Nielsen, the Fourth Circuit held that manifest disregard continues to
exist either "as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on
137 Id. at 477-78.
138 Id. at 478.
139 Id.
40 Id. at 483.
141 Id. at 480.
42 Id.
143 Id. at 481 (quotation marks omitted).
"4 Id.
1s Id. at 482.
16 Id.
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the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at [the FAA] § 1011:147
We do not decide whether "manifest disregard" survives our
decision in Hall Street Associates, as an independent ground for
review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur
set forth at [the FAA] § 10. AnimalFeeds characterizes that
standard as requiring a showing that the arbitrators knew of the
relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle
controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless
willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.
Assuming, arguendo, that such a standard applies, we find it
satisfied.14 1
The Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Stolt-Nielsen closely tracked the majority of circuits' approach to
manifest disregard before Hall Street: the Supreme Court noted that there
was clearly apposite law, that the panel did not apply the applicable law,
and that it acknowledged that it was departing from the applicable law.'4 9
Because the Fourth Circuit found that Wachovia's claim failed under both
the survival and the judicial gloss theory, it did not have to decide which
of the two.' In fact, under either theory, the Fourth Circuit's manifest
disregard standard is unchanged after Hall Street."'
VII. ANALYSIS OF WACHOVIA SEcuRTEs, LLC v. BRAND
A. Introduction
Black's Law Dictionary defines 'horizontal stare decisis' as "[t]he
doctrine that a court, [especially] an appellate court, must adhere to its
own prior decisions, unless it finds compelling reasons to overrule
itself."' 5 2 Apart from stating the fact that Hall Street injected uncertainty
147 Id. at 483.
148 Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen II, S. Ct. at 1768 n.3).
149 Id. at 482-83.
iso Id. at 483.
15 Id. ("We do not read Hall Street or Stolt-Nielsen as loosening the carefully circumscribed standard that
we had previously articulated for manifest disregard. Whether manifest disregard is a "judicial gloss" or an
independent ground for vacatur, it is not an invitation to review the merits of the underlying arbitration.
Therefore, we see no reason to depart from our two-part test which has for decades guaranteed that review for
manifest disregard not grow into the kind of probing merits review that would undermine the efficiency of
arbitration.") (citation omitted).
is2 BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009).
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and a circuit split exists, no reasons for overruling its precedent were
discussed in the Fourth Circuit's Wachovia opinion.'5 ' Despite the fact that
"a court must strictly follow the decisions handed down by [a] higher
[court],"' the Fourth Circuit neither made an effort to put the
Supreme Court's holding in Hall Street in a wider context nor to analyze
that holding's consequences. It may be inferred that the Fourth Circuit
found itself in a position where it could choose to which of the three
camps, previously discussed, it should belong, without further in-depth
analysis. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's application of Stolt-Nielsen
suggests that it failed to maintain separate the concepts of arbitration in its
analysis. The Wachovia opinion suggests that, unless the Supreme Court
expressly states, "as a consequence of Hall Street, it follows that manifest
disregard is not applicable under the FAA," the Fourth Circuit will
interpret the Supreme Court's language in superficial ways in order to
continue its own line of cases.
This article argues that the Fourth Circuit should have acknowledged
that its own line of cases were inconsistent with Hall Street; therefore,
they should have been overruled. The Fourth Circuit in its Wachovia
opinion held that "manifest disregard continues to exist either as an
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss"' on excess of
power. This cannot be so. The first proposition is explicitly rejected by
the Supreme Court in Hall Street. The second proposition fails because
manifest disregard cannot be a gloss on excess of power because the
concepts are distinguishable. In addition, the Fourth Circuit should have
given no weight to Stolt-Nielsen because, in that ruling, the Supreme
Court explicitly stated that it "[did] not decide whether 'manifest
disregard' survives [its] decision in Hall Street.""sc
B. The Supreme Court Explicitly Rejected Manifest Disregard as an
Independent Ground for Review
The Supreme Court's statement in Hall Street, that the grounds for
vacatur in the FAA are "exclusive,"15 7  does not leave room for
interpretation. In order to reach the opposite conclusion, two
presumptions would have to be made: that Congress implicitly intended
'5 See Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 481.
154 BLACK's LAw DicTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 'vertical stare decisis').
1ss Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 483.
156 Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3.
157 Hall St., 552 U.S. at 578.
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for grounds for vacatur in addition to those enumerated in the FAA; and
that the Supreme Court's statement in Hall Street, that the grounds for
vacatur in the FAA are "exclusive," 1 5 8 does not preclude manifest
disregard as a proper basis for vacating an arbitration award under the
FAA. It is true that the Supreme Court in Hall Street held that the parties
may not, by contract, expand the basis for vacatur beyond those provided
in the FAA.' But since arbitration is based on the parties' agreement,'
and Congress enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to
arbitration with a national policy favoring it,"' the most rational
conclusion is that the judiciary should not be given more control over the
process than the parties. Consequently, if the parties are not allowed to
contract for additional grounds for vacatur, the judiciary should not be
allowed to apply non-statutory grounds for vacatur. The Supreme Court
recognized that its decision did not "exclude more searching review
based on authority outside the statute as well,"162 when a court
"contemplate[s] enforcement under state statutory or common law."' 6 3
The Wachovia opinion presumed that the FAA applied; there was no
discussion that it did not apply and that state statutory or common law was
the applicable law instead.' Therefore, the FAA's exclusive grounds for
vacatur were the only ones available to the Fourth Circuit in this case.
C. Manifest Disregard Cannot Be a Shorthand or a judicial Gloss on the
FAA5 1 0(a)(4)
It may be inferred that the Fourth Circuit interpreted its sister circuits'
split as an open door to join whichever of the three camps it found most
fit. But the Fourth Circuit should have carried out a more thorough
independent analysis. The Fourth Circuit did not discuss the reasoning
behind its sister circuits' differing conclusions, it merely noted the
conclusions they had reached. As the circuit split shows, "several circuits
have stepped out of line"' 5 in their application of Hall Street. Thomas H.
Oehmke asserts that "[t]his is not necessarily judicial arrogance."' He
158 Id.
159 Id.
' Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. at 1774.
161 Hall St., 552 U.S. at 581.
162 Id. at 590.
16 Id.
164 See Waclrovia, 671 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012).
165 4 OEHMKE, supra note 33, S 149-3.
16 Id.
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reasons that "many courts feel bound by their own precedent unless and
until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the U.S.
Supreme Court or the circuit court sitting en banc."' 6' Therefore, some
circuit courts will "adher[e] to circuit precedent despite a ruling by the
U.S. Supreme Court having cryptically cast doubt on prior holdings."1 6 1
Nonetheless, the third camp seems to dilute and blur concepts in
arbitration in order to keep manifest disregard alive. The third camp holds
that manifest disregard continues to exist as a shorthand or a judicial gloss
on the enumerated grounds in the FAA, and applies manifest disregard
unchanged post-Hall Street.16 1 It is telling, but not surprising, that the
Fourth Circuit did not find it necessary to decide whether it belonged to
the second or the third camp because the courts belonging to the third
camp have not articulated any difference between manifest disregard as an
independent ground for vacatur as compared to a shorthand or a gloss on
the enumerated grounds in the FAA.170 This alone is suspicious and
indicates that the courts in the third camp use sweeping language to
follow their own line of cases.
The third camp's inclusion of the manifest disregard doctrine in the
FAA § 10(a)(4) fails because the concepts are distinguishable. The manifest
disregard doctrine challenges the arbitrator's application of the law to the
dispute at hand, while a challenge of the arbitrator's power queries
whether the arbitrator's contractual authority extended to resolving the
dispute at hand. The latter examines the arbitrator's interpretation of the
arbitration agreement to determine his or her power to adjudicate the
dispute.
D. The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation of Stolt-Nielsen is Flawed
The Fourth Circuit incorrectly found that "the Supreme Court's
more recent decision in Stolt-Nielsen sheds further light on the operation
of 'manifest disregard' post-Hall Street,"1 7 1 even though the Supreme
Court explicitly stated that it did "not decide whether 'manifest disregard'
survives [its] decision in Hall Street, as an independent ground for review
or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at
[the FAA] § 10."72 The Fourth Circuit read this "to mean that manifest
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Wahovia, 671 F.3d at 481-82 n.7.
70 Id. at 483.
171 Id. at 482.
172 Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3.
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disregard continues to exist either 'as an independent ground for review or
as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at [the
FAA] § 10.' "173
By finding support for its conclusion in the Stolt-Nielsen opinion,
the Fourth Circuit demonstrates that it failed to separate different aspects
of arbitration. The Stolt-Nielsen opinion decided whether a party might
be referred, under the FAA, to class arbitration, when the arbitration
clause is silent on the question.174 This question relates to the arbitration
clause and the arbitrators' authority to decide the dispute. Whether an
arbitrator is authorized to decide a dispute is a completely different
question from how an arbitrator decided a dispute that he was authorized
to decide. The Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen described arbitration as
"simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those
disputes-but only those disputes-that the parties have agreed to submit
to arbitration. "17' The Court held that "it follows that a party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so."176
To follow the Supreme Court's reasoning, which concluded that the
arbitrators went beyond their powers as given to them by the parties'
arbitration clause, there is no reason to do anything else than what the
Supreme Court did, which was to apply contract law. State law generally
governs the interpretation of an arbitration agreement, but the FAA
imposes certain fundamental rules, including the need for consent, as
opposed to coercion.1 7 7  The parties' "intentions control" the
interpretation, and the courts must give effect to the contractual rights
and expectations of the parties.17 The Supreme Court's contract
interpretation in Stolt-Nielsen is analogous to its statutory interpretation
in Hall Street. In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court concluded that the
parties' arbitration clause did not expressly include class action arbitration;
therefore, an interpretation including class action arbitration was
prohibited. Likewise, in Hall Street, the Supreme Court held that the
FAA's enumerated grounds for vacatur were exclusive; therefore,
173 Wachovia, 671 F.3d at 483.
174 See Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. at 1775. See also Gronlund, supra note 32, at 1353-54 ("The only
instance in which the Court granted certiorari for a case involving manifest disregard [after Hall Street] was [Stolt-
Nielsen]. However, the Court decided the case on different grounds and did not address the current controversy
regarding the validity of manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur.").
i7 Stolt-Nielsen II, 130 S. Ct. at 1774.
176 Id. at 1775.
177 Id. at 1773.
i78 Id. at 1773-74.
WACHOVIA SECURITIES, LLC V. BRAND
contracting for more extensive review was prohibited. In these two cases,
the arbitration clause and the FAA were both interpreted according to
their plain language, a "four corners" of the contract/statute
interpretation.
Although the Supreme Court in its Stolt-Nielsen decision expressly
said that its opinion did not touch on the continued validity of the
grounds of "manifest disregard,""' the Fourth Circuit held that the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen closely tracked the majority
of circuits' approach to manifest disregard before Hall Street: the Supreme
Court noted that there was clearly apposite law, that the panel did not
apply the applicable law, and that the panel acknowledged that it was
departing from the applicable law."so The Fourth Circuit seems to be
operating under the misconception that the Supreme Court discussed the
arbitrator's application of the law to the dispute at hand. However, the
Supreme Court only discussed whether the arbitrator's contractual
authority extended to class action arbitration. In other words, the
Supreme Court only reviewed the arbitrator's interpretation of the
arbitration agreement to determine his or her power to adjudicate the
dispute.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit in its Wachovia opinion held that "manifest
disregard continues to exist either as an independent ground for review or
as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at [the
FAA] § 10."" This cannot be so. The first proposition is explicitly
rejected by the Supreme Court in Hall Street. The second proposition fails
because manifest disregard cannot be a gloss on excess of power because
the concepts are distinguishable. The manifest disregard doctrine
challenges the arbitrator's application of the law to the dispute at hand,
while a challenge of the arbitrator's power queries whether the arbitrator's
contractual authority extended to resolving the dispute at hand.
One can speculate whether the thin reasoning of the Fourth Circuit
demonstrates judicial arrogance, hostility towards arbitration, or excessive
respect for its own stare decisis. Nonetheless, it certainly shows that the
Supreme Court must spell out that manifest disregard of the law is not a
ground for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA in order for the
179 Id. at 1768 n.3.
180 Wahovia, 671 F.3d at 482-83.
181 Id. at 483.
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circuit courts to finally disregard it. Until then, it seems as if some circuit
courts will not give more weight to the Supreme Court's Hall Street
opinion than to their own precedents in this matter.
